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PROMULGATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF
HOUSE RULES
In the flurry and excitement of buying a condominium, a pur-
chaser is apt to pay scant attention to the "bylaws"' that govern the
property. Often, it is not until he encounters the day-to-day problems
of living in his unit that the new owner feels the full force and effect
of bylaw regulation. He may not realize at the time of purchase that
the bylaws can preclude activity he considers acceptable or that they
may be subsequently amended to diminish rights he would never
willingly relinquish. A resident, because of ambiguous language2 in, or
his own careless reading of, the bylaws, may suddenly find himself on a
collision course with a board of managers bent on enforcing uniformity
of unit appearance and "acceptable" individual activity.
One owner who lovingly transforms his balcony into a stucco and
glass Italian villa may be shocked to find a board of managers demand-
ing he remove it because the neighbors think it is hideous.3 Another
may learn to his distress that he is being assessed for a $500 basketball
court that the board has decided no one can do without. He hates the
game!4 And every year someone cannot understand why an exception
to the "no dog" rule cannot be made for the little German schnauzer
that is the comfort of Grandma's old age.5
Though many have tried, unit owners have generally been unable
to evade enforcement of such rules by their boards of managers. Resul-
tant litigation has led to animosity, warring factions of unit owners, and
even sell-outs and foreclosures. It is becoming increasingly obvious that
the extent to which a board of managers may control or compel in-
dividual behavior and authorize expenditures under governing bylaws
must be more clearly defined and communicated to prospective pur-
l "Bylaws" are those rules which govern the operation, maintenance and repair of a
condominium community. They typically regulate the use of the premises by owners,
specify restraints on alienation, provide for a board of administrators or managers to act
as the quasi-governmental body of the project and empower it with specific duties. See
I P. ROHAN AND M. REsKIN, CONDOMINIUM LAW AND PRACrc § 3.03 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as ROHAN & RESKIN]. See generally Rohan, Cooperative Housing: An Appraisal of
Residential Controls and Enforcement Procedures, 18 STAN. L. REv. 1323 (1966).
2 Some suggestions for drafting condominium documents are discussed in Rohan,
Drafting Condominium Instruments: Provisions for Destruction, Obsolescence and Emi-
nent Domain, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 593, 604-06 (1965).
3 Cf. Vinik v. Taylor, 270 So. 2d 413 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. 1972).
4 See Amoruso v. Board of Managers, 38 App. Div. 2d 845, 330 N.Y.S.2d 107 (2d
Dep't 1972) (mem.). See note 92 infra for a discussion of this case.
5 See, e.g., East Midtown Plaza Housing Co., Inc. v. Halpern (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y.
County), in 169 N.Y.L.J. 25, Feb. 5, 1973, at 19, col. 4. For a discussion of the "no dog"
prohibition, see text accompanying notes 60-69 infra.
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chasers. Where bylaws do clearly establish the boundaries of a unit
owner's permissible activity and are nonetheless violated, more ex-
pedient methods of enforcement should be given boards to avoid the
delay, expense and consequent ill-will associated with litigation.
Although fee title in a unit is a concomitant of condominium
ownership, a purchaser shares an undivided interest in the common
elements of the project with his co-owners. 6 This cooperative living
arrangement necessitates the assumption of responsibilities and duties
in the interest of successful operation of the enterprise and social com-
patibility.7 Such obligations may be prohibitive - e.g., refraining from
objectionable behavior such as late night parties" or excessive piano
playing,9 or mandatory -e.g., paying a pro rata share of operational
expenses or installing required fixtures.' 0
CONDOMINIUM ADMINISTRATION
The board of managers administers and interprets the bylaws
which establish unit owners' responsibilities. The power of the board
of managers is initially derived from state condominium enabling
acts." These generally require that the administration of condominium
projects be governed by bylaws' 2 initially promulgated by the original
sponsor of the development and approved, supplemented or amended
by the body of subsequent unit owners.13 Common statutory schemes
require that bylaws entrust responsibility for administration to a board
of managers or other supervisory organization elected by the unit
owners and specify the powers and duties of the board. 4 Bylaws con-
stitute the outer limit of a board's authority.
6 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT., ch. 825, § 47-68(b) (1972); GA. CODE ANN., ch. 85-16B,
§ 85-1604b (1970); IND. ANN. STAT. § 32-1-6-5 (1973).
7 See Schreiber, The Lateral Housing Development: Condominium or Home Owners
Association?, 117 U. PENN. L. REV. 1104, 1140 (1969).
8 Baum v. Ryerson Towers, 55 Misc. 2d 1045, 287 N.Y.S.2d 791 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1968) (mem.) (house rule governing parties in community room held reasonable).
9 Cf. Justice Court Mut. Housing Co-op. v. Sandow, 50 Misc. 2d 541, 270 N.Y.S.2d 829
(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1966) (house rule prohibiting playing of music held unreason-
able).
10 Cf. Linden Hill No. 3 Co-op. Corp. v. Berkman, 61 Misc. 2d 275, 305 N.Y.S.2d 623
(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1969) (upholding co-op requirement that residents replace
refrigerators 12-years-old or more).
11 For an exhaustive list of state condominium enabling acts, see 1A ROHAN & REsKN,
App. B-1.
12See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT., ch. 825, § 47-80(a) (1972); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 711.11(1)
(1969); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-3118 (1964); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-u (McKinney 1968).
13See I ROHAN & RESKIN § 17.05.
14 Some statutes clearly envision that the association of unit owners incorporate and
elect a board of directors. See, e.g., CONN GFN. STAT., ch. 825, § 47-89 (1972); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 711.12(l) (1969); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 318.1 (1969); IND. ANN. STAT. § 32-1-6-8
(1973); S.C. CODE ANN. § 57-502 (Supp. 1973).
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Some states also suggest that bylaws contain regulations known as
"house rules," which govern residents' use and operation of the property,
and that the method for adding, deleting or amending such restrictions
be specified therein.' 5 Since bylaws must nearly always be recorded,
changes in their content will not become effective or enforceable until
they too are recorded.' 6 Furthermore, as a minimum percentage of
unit owners is usually required to modify bylaws, 7 a board may be
effectively prohibited from passing rules absent owner consent or
participation. Within this statutory and documentary framework, a
board of managers' major responsibility is to follow and ensure com-
pliance with its bylaws, thereby serving in a quasi-governmental capac-
ity; when violations of the bylaws occur, the board invokes its police
power.
Bylaw violations are generally of two types: 1) failure to pay pro
rata assessments for maintenance expenditures, and 2) noncompliance
with house rules.' The board's police power consists of determining
whether a violation has occurred and, if so, taking action to rectify
the infraction. When the violation is an owner's failure to pay dollar
assessments, 9 the board can either sue on the debt or utilize the more
expedient method of imposing a lien against individual units which
may be foreclosed in the event of non-payment.20 However, unless
the extent of a violation can be measured in terms of dollars owed to
the association of unit owners,2 ' the board's22 sole recourse may be to
sue for injunctive relief.2 In such an equitable action, the defenses of
15 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT., ch. 825, § 47-80(b)(9) (1972); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW
§ 339-v-l(h) (McKinney 1968).
16 1 ROnAN & RESKIN § 7.03[1] n.14. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 32-1-6-3, 32-1-6-25
(1973) (bylaws to be attached to declaration which is recorded); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw
§ 339-u (McKinney 1968) (bylaws and amendments recorded with declaration); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 64-2707(4) (Supp. 1973) (bylaws recorded with master deed).
17 See 1 ROHAN & RESKIN § 7.03[4], at 7-32, 7-33.
1s Lowell, Prahl, Alessio &: Cazares, Land Use and Operational Controls in the Planned
Development, 9 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 28, 60 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Land Use Controls].
19 One of the board's duties is to prepare the operating budget for the condominium
and assess each unit owner his proportionate share. I ROHAN & RFSKIN § 17A.02[l][a].
20 Land Use Controls, supra note 18, at 60.
21 Id. at 61-62.
22 In most jurisdictions, a unit owner also has standing to bring suit in his own
name. See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-j (McKinney 1968); S.C. CODE ANN. § 57-510
(Supp. 1973).
23 For those statutes expressly creating a right to injunctive relief, see I ROHAN &
R.SKIN § 10.02, 10-5 n.8. South Carolina has since added an injunctive remedy for non-
compliance. S.C. CODE § 57-510 (Supp. 1973). The Illinois act now allows bylaws to
provide management the right of forcible entry and detainer in cases of bylaw in-
fractions. ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 30, § 309.2 (Supp. 1973). New York, too, provides an
additional remedy. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-j (McKinney 1968) allows management to
require securities in the event of recurrent breaches of bylaws and house rules. See text
accompanying notes 25-26 infra.
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waiver and estoppel would be available to the alleged violator.24
Two states now provide other enforcement measures. In New
York, when a board of managers is faced with recurring abuses of
bylaws or house rules, it may demand surety from the misbehaving
resident "for his future compliance. ' 25 Illinois will now allow a board
to maintain an action for forcible entry and detainer "for any infrac-
tion" if the bylaws so provide.26 Although the Illinois approach may
appear harsh, the requirement that such a provision appear in the
bylaws effectively puts purchasers on notice. The New York surety
provision, although not required to appear in the bylaws, avoids the
harshness of the Illinois result while encouraging compliance via a
monetary sanction and avoiding the necessity of litigation. As these
remedies have only recently been available, there is little commentary
or case law on them. However, judicial attitudes toward the propriety
of actions taken by condominium management and the enforceability
of these and other bylaws may be gauged by an examination of prior
actions for injunctive relief.
ENFORCEMENT OF HOUSE RULES
Courts are generally prone to enforce proper house rules. These
regulations must be reasonably related to stated purposes,27 enacted
according to the provisions of bylaws, 28 "consistent with the law,"29
and not destructive of any vested right.30
24Land Use Controls, supra note 18, at 59. Courts have rarely sustained these
defenses. But see note 63 infra. Cf. Board of Managers v. Gans, 72 Misc. 2d 726, 340
N.Y.S.2d 826 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Queens County 1972) (unit owners who paid assessments
for 2 years following unrecorded change in bylaw election procedure estopped from
refusing to pay next assessment).
25 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-j (McKinney 1968). New York recently rejected a bill
which would have required condominium bylaws to provide for arbitration of disputes
between a board of managers and the unit owners when 40% of the latter request it. See
A. 10221, 195th Sess. (1972).
20 ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 30, § 309.2 (Supp. 1973).
27 Cf. Baum v. Ryerson Towers, 55 Misc. 2d 1045, 1047, 287 N.Y.S.2d 791, 794 (Sup.
Ct. Kings County 1968) (mem.); Justice Court Mut. Housing Co-op., Inc. v. Sandow,
50 Misc. 2d 541, 544, 270 N.Y.S.2d 829, 832 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1966); Vernon
Manor Co-op Apts. v. Salatino, 15 Misc. 2d 491, 495, 178 N.Y.S.2d 895, 900 (Westchester
County Ct. 1958).2
sSee KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-3128 (1964); MINN STAT. ANN. § 515.28(b) (Supp. 1974).
But cf. Board of Managers of Gen. Apt. Corp. Condominium v. Gans, 72 Misc. 2d 726, 340
N.Y.S.2d 826 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Queens County 1972) (although election procedure not
recorded in bylaws, acts of subsequently selected board not invalid).
29 Vernon Manor Co-op Apts. v. Salatino, 15 Misc. 2d 491, 494, 178 N.Y.S.2d 895, 900
(Westchester County Ct. 1958), citing N.Y. COOPERATIVE COP.POPAIONs LAw § 14(i) (McKin-
ney 1968).
30 See Vernon Manor Co-op Apts., Section I v. Saatino, 15 Misc. 2d 491, 495, 178
N.Y.S2d 895, 900 (Westchester County Ct. 1958) (prior permission to use washing machines
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Alterations or Additions by Unit Owners
Rules restricting a unit owner in making alterations or additions
ordinarily require him to obtain some form of approval before he be-
gins construction. Depending on where the proposed change is to be
made and how substantial it is, bylaws usually mandate approval by
either the board of managers or a percentage of unit owners. In con-
dominium complexes, the property to which modifications can be
made is classified as one of three possible types, viz., common element,
limited common area or individual unit.31 If a resident wishes to make
an alteration or addition within his own unit, approval by the board
alone is usually sufficient.32 If, however, a limited common area or a
common element is involved, consent by the affected unit owners, a
percentage of the entire association or sometimes even unanimous
approval may be required.
When a controversy arises as to a resident's right to make some
addition or alteration, three issues are involved: 1) the character of
the property affected, 2) the nature of the alteration or addition, and
3) the type of approval necessary and whether it has been obtained. In
attempting to resolve these issues, courts generally first examine the
condominium enabling statute for relevant provisions. They then
consider the declaration and bylaws in light of the statute and attempt
to reconcile the three. Sterling Village Condominium, Inc. v. Breiten-
bach'3 followed this approach. The Breitenbachs owned a condominium
unit with an attached screened porch to which they had sole access.
They decided to replace the screen with glass jalousies and sought
permission to do so from the incorporated association of unit owners.
Despite denial of their request, they installed the jalousies and the
corporation, upon their refusal to re-install the screening, sued. 4
The Florida District Court of Appeal held for the managing cor-
does not create any vested right in their future use). See also Kent v. Quicksilver Mining
Co., 78 N.Y. 159, 183 (1879) (corporation bylaws must not disturb vested rights).
31 Most state enabling statutes define the common elements. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 711.06 (1969); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-e(3) (McKinney 1968). Limited common
elements are usually designated in the condominium documents. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 711.03(11) (1969). KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-31020) (Supp. 1973). The boundaries of the
units are also demarcated in these instruments.
32 See CAL. CiV. CODE § 1353(d) (West Supp. 1974) (exclusive right to redecorate
inner surfaces of units); accord, Miss. CODE ANN., ch. 2A, § 896-07(D) (Supp. 1972). But cf.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 711.13(3) (1969) (unit owner may not make any changes which would
jeopardize building); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §8339-k (McKinney 1968) (unanimous approval
by owners required to make substantial addition or to put in a cellar). For a definition
of "material ,alteration," see note 89 infra.
33 251 So. 2d 685 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist.), cert. denied, 254 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1971).
34 The incorporated owners association brought suit for mandatory injunction pur-
suant to the relevant Florida statute. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 711.28 (1969).
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poration and ordered the Brietenbachs to either replace the screening
or get permission from the unit owners for the jalousies.35 In its
decision, the court found applicable the provision of Florida's enabling
act prohibiting "material alteration or substantial addition to the
common elements except in a manner provided in the regulations." 36
As the declaration of the condominium expressly designated the
porches limited common elements,37 the court felt that if the change
constituted a "substantial alteration "S 8 permission from the association
would be required. It subsequently found that replacing screening
with glass jalousies effectively changed the character of the porches
such as to constitute a "substantial" or "material" alteration.39 Signifi-
cantly, the court stated that it would strictly construe both the condo-
minium statute and documents to ensure investors "that what the buyer
sees, the buyer gets." 40
The policy of strictly construing bylaws led to a different result
in the same Florida court one year later, in Vinik v. Taylor.41 Taylor,
an individual unit owner, wanted to enclose the balcony of his unit
with stucco archways. Permission was granted from the condominium
association's board of directors. An adjoining unit owner, Vinik, ob-
jected, claiming that approval of a percentage of the unit owners was
necessary since the balconies constituted common elements of the
building. Though the court sympathized with the plaintiff, it dis-
tinguished Breitenbach, noting that Taylor's condominium did not
specify in its bylaws that the balconies were either limited common
areas42 or part of the common elements. On the contrary, the court's
examination of the condominium instruments showed that the bal-
conies were intended to be part of the units themselves.43 The bylaws
provided that alteration of the units could be undertaken with approval
from the board alone. The court, therefore, reluctantly held Taylor to
36 251 So. 2d at 688.
36 Id. at 686, citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 711.3 (1969).
37 Despite the fact that porches were designated limited common elements, under
another provision of the declaration the unit owners alone were responsible for their
maintenance. 251 So. 2d at 686.
38 Id. at 688. The court apparently equated "limited common elements" with "com-
mon elements," so as to come within the purview of the statute. Id. at 687.
30 We hold that as applied to buildings the term 'material alteration or addition'
means to palpably or perceptively vary or change the form, shape, elements or
specifications of a building from its original design or plan, or existing condition,
in such a manner as to appreciably affect or influence its function, use, or
appearance.
Id. at 687.
40 Id. at 688.
41270 So. 2d 413 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. 1972).
42 Id. at 415 n.5.
43 Id. at 416.
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be within his rights to retain the arches. However, the decision was con-
cluded with a strong admonition to the board for having approved
so radical a change in the exterior appearance of the building.4 4 The
court noted that once such a procedure was sanctioned by the bylaws,
neither the court nor other unit owners could substitute their aesthetic
judgment for that of the board.
New owners should be wary of bylaws which grant unfettered
authority to a board of managers to approve exterior alterations. It is
not always clear, however, whether board approval has even been ob-
tained. For example, in the New York case of Moran v. Berk,45 a unit
owner cut a gate into his street-level terrace. The issue was whether
he had obtained the requisite consent from the board of managers
pursuant to the bylaws. The pertinent provision required owners
desiring to make any "structural alterations" to serve a 30-day notice
upon the board. If, within that period, the board had neither granted
nor denied permission, the owner could proceed. In Moran, the board
issued an approval which was conditioned upon "an attorney's finding
and bank's approval. '4 No further statements were made, and the
owner went ahead and cut his gate. In the subsequent injunctive
action,47 the court held that the board had given not an unqualified
consent but a conditional approval, and since the conditions had not
been met, the owner was not free to proceed. He was, therefore,
ordered to restore the terrace to its original condition. Hence, New York
appears to follow the strict interpretation rules enunciated in Breiten-
bach and Vinik, according great weight to actions of the board of
managers pursuant to the bylaws.
Certain additions to common elements may require approval by
unit owners immediately affected by the change. In Graff v. Lackait, 48
a New York court granted a unit owner an order directing the removal
of a fence erected by his neighbor on common elements. The defendant
had previously applied for permission to erect the fence, but approval
44 If succeeding applicants are loosely granted such approval, it could lead to a
hodge-podge or bizarre outward appearance, . . . and different architectural
treatments given sway. It could very well harm or destroy the symmetry and
attractiveness of the building ....
Id. at 417.
45 No. 2470-72 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County, April 20, 1972), discussed in 1 CoN-
DOMINIUM REP., Nov. 1973, at 2.
46 Id.
47 The board had ordered the owner to return the gate to its original condition and
imposed a fine for each- day's delay in doing so. The owner refused and sued to restrain
the board from interfering with the use of his gate. The board, in turn, requested an
order enforcing its demand and a judgment for the penalty. In holding for the board,
the court nevertheless refused to enforce the penalty.
48 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County), in 170 N.Y.L.J. 28, Aug. 9, 1973, at 11, col. 3.
1138 [Vol. 48:1132
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had been denied by the board which wanted only ranch-style fences in
the area. As the defendant had not only failed to conform the fence to
standards but also neglected to obtain permission from adjoining unit
owners, the court directed the fence's removal.49
Just how far the rule of reason will permit limiting proposed
changes on aesthetic or structural grounds, or prohibiting them en-
tirely, is not clear. -Even the common requirement that exterior
appearances be uniform is subject to criticism when the condominium
is a lateral development.5" Where lateral units are detached, the ques-
tion assumes more significance. A rule requiring all fences extending
along the common elements of a condominium to be of specific style
and dimensions has been held reasonable and enforceable.51 However,
what if an owner decided to plant pricker bushes all around his unit
or add an apple tree to the front yard?52 May condominium manage-
ment go so far as to control the type of planting an owner wishes to
do? Certainly, if the complex provides lawn maintenance as part of
its services, the tree and bushes might present vexing problems inter-
fering with and threatening the safety of maintenance crews. In that
case, a court might uphold such regulation for valid reasons even
though the resident technically owns the land. Moreover, even the
reason of aesthetic uniformity might pass muster in a court determined
to uphold the bylaws and to see that "what the buyer sees, the buyer
gets."5 3 However, in the absence of such business, safety or reasonable
aesthetic justification, condominium management might be hard-
pressed to enforce landscaping regulations in the courts.
Use of Appliances
Resolutions controlling the use of appliances in condominium
units will be upheld as long as they are not arbitrary and are the result
of valid business considerations. 54 Though most litigation in this area
49 The court rejected the defenses of waiver and estoppel on the facts presented.
Although the board had previously approved other fences, they had apparently con-
formed to a specified type. Id.
GO See note 44 supra. See also Sterling Village Condominium, Inc. v. Breitenbach, 251
So. 2d 685, cert. denied, 254 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1971).
51 Graff v. Lackaitz (Sup. Ct. Nassau County), in 170 N.Y.L.J. 28, Aug. 9, 1973, at 11,
col. S.
52 Dense planting is a common method of obtaining privacy in thickly settled com-
munities. By the clever use of bushes and trees, it is possible to effectively obliterate any
view of or by one's neighbors.
53 Sterling Village Condominium, Inc. v. Breitenbach, 251 So. 2d 685, 688 (Dist. Ct.
App. Fla., 4th Dist.), cert. denied, 254 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1971). "The individual ought not
be permitted to disrupt the integrity of the common scheme through his desire for
change, however laudable that change might be." Id.
54 See Justice Court Mut. Housing Co-op., Inc. v. Sandow, 50 Misc. 2d 541, 545, 270
1974] 1139
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has concerned restrictions on using washing machines in cooperative
apartments, the reasoning of these cases applies equally well to con-
dominium units. Courts have sustained regulations prohibiting the
installation of washing machines entirely,55 except in the rare case
where questions of reasonableness, waiver, estoppel or vested rights are
presented. 56 Even if washers have already been installed, it is possible
for management to prohibit future installations.57 It has also been
held reasonable to impose monthly service charges for the use of
washing machines.58 Moreover, even if machines have previously been
in use, no vested right operates to prohibit subsequently imposed ser-
vice charges.59
Pets
Problems of clean-up 6 and exposure to other residents have
caused many cooperative housing communities to prohibit pets al-
together.6' Courts generally have adopted a hard-line approach and
have upheld a board's power to refuse admittance to dogs as reasonable
and enforceable. 62 Though occasionally successful in lower courts, resi-
dents who acquire animals knowing of a prohibition against them
will usually lose on appeal despite theories of waiver and estoppel,63
N.Y.S.2d 829, 832 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1966) (ppliances may affect plumbing, wiring
or the building structure). See also Hilltop Village Co-op. No. 4, Inc. v. Wolman, 13
Misc. 2d 753, 178 N.Y.S.2d 498 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1957).
55 Forest Park Co-op. v. Helman, 2 Misc. 2d 183, 152 N.Y.S.2d 685 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1956).
56See, e.g., Opoliner v. Joint Queensview Housing Enterprise, Inc., 11 App. Div.
2d 1076, 206 N.Y.S.2d 681 (2d Dep't 1960).
57 Cf. Vernon Manor Co-op. Apts. v. Salatino, 15 Misc. 2d 491, 178 N.Y.S.2d 895
(Westchester County Ct. 1958).
58Garden Hall, Inc. v. Abidor, 18 Misc. 2d 584, 184 N.Y.S.2d 257 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1959); Hilltop Village Co-op. No. 4, Inc. v. Wolman, 13 Misc. 2d 753, 178 N.Y.S.2d
498 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1957).
59 Vernon Manor Co-op. Apts. v. Salatino, 15 Misc. 2d 491, 178 N.Y.S.2d 895 (West-
chester County Ct. 1958).
6OSee Justice Court Mut. Housing Co-op. v. Sandow, 50 Misc. 2d 541, 545, 270
N.Y.S.2d 829, 832 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1966) (pets create problems of sanitation).
61 Dog "amortization" can be an effective and enforceable method of introducing
a "no dog" rule into previously uncontrolled areas. Residents who already have pets
are permitted to keep them, but when the animal dies they may not replace it. Ideally
this results in a slow phase-out of animals in the community. See Knolls Co-op. Sec. No.
II, Inc. v. Cashman, 14 N.Y.S.2d 579, 198 N.E.2d 255, 248 N.Y.S.2d 875 (1964) (cannot
replace dog under "dog amortization" rule; five year delay in bringing action no defense).
62 East Midtown Plaza Housing Co., Inc. v. Halpern, 169 N.Y.L.J. 25, Feb. 5, 1973,
at 19, col. 4 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County).
63 See 930 Fifth Corp. v. King, 64 Misc. 2d 776, 315 N.Y.S.2d 966 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct.
N.Y. County 1970), aff'd, 71 Misc. 2d 359, 336 N.Y.S.2d 22 (Ist Dep't 1972), rev'd, 40
App. Div. 2d 140, 338 N.Y.S.2d 773 (1st Dep't 1972), appeal dismissed, 31 N.Y.2d 1046,
294 N.E.2d 856, 342 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1973) (mem.). But see Mutual Redevelopment Houses,
Inc. v. Hanft, 42 Misc. 2d 1044, 249 N.Y.S.2d 988 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1964)
(waiver defense upheld).
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emotional dependence, 64 safety precautions,6 5 or love.66 Furthermore,
proprietary leases may constitutionally provide that "no harboring of
dogs" clauses are a substantial obligation of the agreement, enforceable
by proceedings.6 7 As a dog-harboring lessee may thus risk forfeiture if
he fails to remove the offending canine, a question arises as to whether
a similarly stubborn condominium owner could be removed for such
an infraction. In most states, by the nature of his estate, a unit owner
cannot be expelled.6 8 Enabling statutes, however, could allow bylaws
to provide that violations would give rise to a right of reentry and
expulsion.69
Nuisances
Activities which might prove annoying to fellow residents may be
regulated by the board of managers. Such restrictions, however, must
also be reasonable, related to stated purposes, and not aimed at a
specific resident in the absence of a clear rationale.70 A board may not
prohibit the playing of music or musical instruments altogether, nor
may it place unreasonable time limitations on music playing71 or the
use of community party rooms.72
If a resident objects to a nuisance and the board of managers fails
to act, he may bring an action for declaratory relief against the board
to compel its action.7 3 In Baum v. Ryerson Towers,74 the unit owner
64 See Hilltbp Village Co-op. v. Goldstein, 41 Misc. 2d 402, 244 N.Y.S.2d 454, rev'd,
43 Misc. 2d 657, 658, 252 N.Y.S.2d 7, 8 (2d Dep't 1964), aff'd, 23 App. Div. 2d 722, 258
N.Y.S.2d 348 (mem.) (2d Dep't 1965) (that dog was acquired to help emotionally dis-
turbed child did not alter the fact that tenant was in violation of lease).
65 East River Housing Corp. v. Rizzo (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), in 165 N.Y.L.J. 68,
April 9, 1971, at 17, col. 5.
66 East Midtown Plaza Housing Co., Inc. v. Halpern (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County), in
169 N.Y.L.J. 25, Feb. 5, 1973, at 19, col. 4 (elderly woman ordered to remove 17-year-old,
blind and toothless dog).
67930 Fifth Corp. v. King, 40 App. Div. 2d 140, 338 N.Y.S.2d 773 (Ist Dep't 1972),
appeal dismissed, 31 N.Y.2d 1046, 294 N.E.2d 856, 342 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1973) (mem.).
68 Cf. Susskind v. 1136 Tenants Corp., 43 Misc. 2d 588, 592, 251 N.Y.S.2d 321, 327
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1964).
69 See text accompanying note 26 supra for discussion of the Illinois statute which
permits such a bylaw.
70 See Justice Court Mut. Housing Co-op. v. Sandow, 50 Misc. 2d 541, 270 N.Y.S.2d
829 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1966).
71 Id. at 545. Cf. Douglas L. Elliman & Co. v. Karlsen, 59 Misc. 2d 243, 298 N.Y.S.2d
594 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1969) (objection to drum playing).
72 Baum v. Ryerson Towers, 55 Misc. 2d 1045, 287 N.Y.S.2d 791 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1968).
7 3 See Alpern v. Goldsmith (Sup. Ct. Nassau County), in 166 N.Y.L.J. 86, Nov. 4,
1971, at 18, col. 5, in which the New York Supreme Court held that an action against the
board of managers of a condominium could not be brought in the form of an Article
78 proceeding pursuant to N.Y. CIVIL PRAC. § 7801 et seq. (McKinney 1968). Such a suit
to compel activity by the board would be treated as one for a declaratory judgment.
74 55 Misc. 2d 1045, 287 N.Y.S.2d 791 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1968) (mem.).
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complained of late night noisy parties in the community recreation
room. He alleged that this was in violation of a house rule setting
hours for the room's use, that the board was ignoring the violations,
and, alternatively, that the rule itself improperly permitted a nuisance.
The court found that the plaintiff had made no showing of "a public
disturbance' 7 5 and that the hours permitted for parties were reason-
able.7 6 It therefore refused to order the board of managers to act.
A similar action, in which it was alleged that the board of managers
was failing to exercise its discretionary power, was equally unsuccessful.
In Alpern v. Goldsmith77 the condominium owner complained that 1)
the swimming pool deck was being used for eating and parties, 2) that
a dog station had been established nearby, and 3) the parking facilities
of his building were being interfered with by pool users from other
buildings, all with the acquiescence of the board of managers. After
examining the bylaws, declaration and house rules in the factual con-
text, the court found it to be within the discretion of the board to
regulate the complained of activity. The court was reluctant to inter-
fere with management unless the complained of activity could truly be
classified a nuisance. It held that the use of the pool facility was reason-
able and that the parking area near plaintiff's unit was intended to
accommodate extra cars. Whether the dog station constituted a nuisance
was to be considered upon remand for trial.7 s
A more difficult problem is presented when the unit owner him-
self is the nuisance. What can a board do with a resident who is a per-
petual busybody or is noisy, pugnacious, immoral 9 or whose behavior
is so eccentric as to border on the criminal? What if the objection is
not to the unit owner himself but a member of his family or a dis-
tant relative who visits only occasionally? 0 A board of managers be-
leaguered with complaints has little recourse. Unlike the traditional
75 The court treated a house rule regarding use of the community room as akin to
a breach of the peace ordinance. To enjoin potential violation of either would require
a showing of a "nuisance" or "public disturbance." Id. at 1046, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 793.
76 Id. at 1047, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 794.
77 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County), in 166 N.Y.L.J. 86, Nov. 4, 1971, at 18, col. 5.
78 Final adjudication of this action has not yet been reported. Dogs, however, have
been considered a major irritant and are likely to be held a nuisance by the courts. See
text accompanying notes 60-69 supra.
79 Some states specifically prohibit "immoral" or abnormal behavior in condo-
miniums. See, e.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-804(3) (1971).
80 An analogous situation has arisen with tenants subsidized by the New York
City Housing Authority. A longstanding policy of that agency is that if a member of
a tenant's family is undesirable, even though no longer residing in the project, there may
be grounds for evicting the resident. See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law, Tyson v. New
York City Housing Authority, 73 Civ. 859 (S.D.N.Y., filed Feb. 27, 1973).
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lease arrangement under which a landlord may attempt to remove a
tenant,8' condominium ownership in most jurisdictions would prohibit
summary proceedings for such grievances.8 2 However, if the conduct
were tantamount to nuisance, or in violation of statutory or reasonable
bylaw requirements, injunctive relief would be available.83 Otherwise,
the board is most likely limited to its own internal grievance proce-
dures.84
AUTHORITY TO SPEND MONEY
The power of a board of managers to spend money will be ques-
tioned more frequently as problems of obsolescence - particularly
with r~spect to older buildings converted to condominium ownership -
and demands for additional amenities arise.85 Where the statutory or
bylaw authority by which a board may install capital improvements
or maintain and replace obsolete facilities is unclear, the possibility of
litigation from disgruntled unit owners increases. Most enabling laws
are silent as to a board's power to make capital expenditures. 6 They
usually provide, however, that the right to make alterations or im-
provements may be contained in the condominium instruments. 87
These documents often set a dollar maximum which the board is
permitted to spend either for maintenance or additions, with or without
owner approval. 88 Any attempt to minimize or expand the board's
spending power would require amendment of the bylaws.89
When a board acts pursuant to proper authority, the courts will
uphold it, strictly interpreting the power conferred. So long as the
81 Cf. Rohan, Property, 24 SYRAcusz.L. REv. 411, 414 (1973) and cases cited therein.
82 Susskind v. 1136 Tenants Corp., 43 Misc. 2d 588, 592, 251 N.Y.S.2d 321, 327 (N.Y.C.
Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1964). But see text accompanying notes 25 & 26 supra.
83 See text accompanying notes 23 & 24 supra.
84 A board could, for example, request tenants to refrain from their objectionable
behavior. For self-help measures applicable to other situations see Land Use Controls,
supra note 18, at 62.
85 For a discussion of problems encountered by a board of managers in financing
major condominium expenditures, see Rohan, Drafting Condominium Instruments: Pro-
visions for Destruction, Obsolescence and Eminent Domain, 65 COLUm. L. REV. 593, 604-
06 (1965); Note, The South Dakota Condominium Act: Problems of Termination,
Obsolescence, Eminent Domain & Repair, 15 S.D.L. REv. 423 (1970).
86 The usual statutory provision allows management to repair and replace property.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 711.12(5) (1969).
87 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN., ch. 85-16B, § 85-1617(f) (1970); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw
§ 339-v(2)(b) (McKinney 1968).8 8 1n the Westchester Hills Condominium, the board of managers was authorized to
spend up to 55,000 without owner approval. Amoruso v. Board of Managers, 38 App. Div.
2d 845, 330 N.Y.S.2d 107 (2d Dep't 1972) (mem.). A $50,000 ceiling was allowed the board
in the St. Tropez Condominium in New York City. Bylaws, St. Tropez Condominium
(New York, N.Y., Jan. 14, 1965), reprinted in IA ROHAN & RESKIN app. C-l, at app. 92, 104.
89 See text accompanying notes 15-17 supra.
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expense is reasonable and within the imposed dollar limitation an
owner must pay his assessed pro rata share.90 He may not evade payment
of the common charges by abstaining from use of the improvements.9
In Amoruso v. Board of Managers9 2 the New York Appellate Division
upheld the right of a board to assess all unit owners for a $500 basket-
ball court pursuant to a bylaw permitting it to make expenditures
for additions costing up to $5,000 without seeking unit owner approval.
Courts seem to uphold any authority granted by the bylaws in this area,
and it is doubtful that the "reasonableness" requirement could be
invoked to prohibit the expenditure of any amount of money pursuant
to bylaw authority. The reasonable limitation is probably applicable
only to the type of expenditure. Since Amoruso found a basketball
court to be a reasonable expense, the rule of reason thus applied would
appear to be quite flexible.
To the extent that expenditures can be considered for repair or
replacement, the board's authority is usually not questioned. 93 How-
ever, when building code violations, changes in fire and health codes, 94
or the simple desire for better living 5 occasion sizeable expenditures,
the authority of the board may not be so clear.
Though the desire for capital improvements will undoubtedly
increase as owners become aware of the additional amenities offered
by the newest condominiums, no board of managers should have un-
fettered authority to spend and assess without some degree of unit
owner approval. However, even where some owner approval is re-
quired, the wishes of the majority may cause undue hardship for the
minority. A retired couple living on a fixed income may face economic
disaster if burdened unexpectedly by large assessments necessary to
finance the swimming pool desired by two-thirds of their co-owners.
In view of this possibility, those provisions relating to capital improve-
ments should be carefully scrutinized before buying in.
90 Amoruso v. Board of Managers, 38 App. Div. 2d 845, 330 N.Y.S.2d 107 (2d Dep't
1972) (mem.).
91 This is a common statutory prohibition. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN., ch. 85-16(B),
§ 85-1619b (1970); KAN. SrAT. ANN. § 58-3121 (1964).
92 38 App. Div. 2d 845, 330 N.Y.S.2d 107 (2d Dep't 1972) (mem.).
93 Cf. Linden Hill No. 3 Co-op. Corp. v. Berkman, 61 Misc. 2d 275, 305 N.Y.S.2d 623
(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1969) (resolution requiring all co-op tenants to replace refrigera-
tors more than 12 years old upheld).
94 For example, an older building might require new fire escapes, electrical wiring or
incinerators.
95 A transformed condominium would probably not be in a position to compete




Much of the potential friction between condominium management
and residents is traceable to the contents of the bylaws themselves. If
they are unclear as to the powers conferred upon a board of managers,
residents are likely to question board authority to take certain mea-
sures. If the bylaws are vague as to what types of activities can and will
be regulated, unit owners will be more apt to go to court than to
modify their lifestyles. The solution lies in careful draftsmanship,
detailing the powers and duties of the managers and attempting to
anticipate contingencies. If the bylaws specifically delineate those in-
fractions of rules that might result in injunctive action, or forfeiture
of surety or even of ownership, residents and the courts will be put on
notice of how substantial the obligations are. Since it is not possible
to foresee all the problems that will arise in condominium management,
the board, as a quasi-government, needs some flexibility to act, e.g.,
in the event of emergencies. At the very minimum, however, the by-
laws should inform the unit owner of what is contemplated.
Louise Hickok
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